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Creating Bookmarks in Adobe

~ Andy Taylor

We are often asked about creating bookmarks in Adobe, so this post provides a brief explanation of the basics of creating bookmarks. PLEASE NOTE that under the current rules, you must create hyperlinks in your appellate briefs. For instructions on how to do that, visit our previous blog post on the topic.

So, why would anyone need to know about bookmarks? Two reasons come to mind. First, the proposed rules regarding electronic filing require the use of bookmarks. So, if you’re planning to participate in the pilot project, you’ll need to know how to use bookmarks. Second, for ease of navigation, we usually add bookmarks even when we’re proceeding under the current rules (in addition to the required hyperlinks). We do this because we’ve heard anecdotally that some judges prefer bookmarks to hyperlinks, and we think the proposed rule changes (which mandate bookmarks) support that view.

With that background in mind, we move now to the directions. (Note that in the screenshots below, we have simply used the Arkansas Supreme Court’s model appellant’s brief.)

Step 1: Open the bookmarks pane

Click the icon on the left side of the screen that looks like an old-school bookmark. (If you cannot see that icon, there is a very small right-facing arrow that you’ll need to click first.)

Step 2: Browse to the portion of the brief that you are bookmarking

At this point, you’ll simply browse to the part of the brief you want to bookmark. If you want to make Step 4 slightly easier, highlight the text at the beginning of that portion of the brief.

Step 3: Click the “New Bookmark” button

Once you’ve browsed to the page you’re bookmarking, click the “New Bookmark” button.

Step 4: Name your bookmark

If you highlighted the text in Step 2, then your bookmark will already be named. Otherwise, just type the name of the bookmark.

There are more advanced features to bookmarking (such as nesting), but those are outside the scope of this blog post.

Hallelujah! (In other words, the Arkansas Supreme Court is abolishing the abstract and addendum requirement.)

Arkansas Justice Building--Home of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Arkansas Court of Appeals
~ Andy Taylor

As we noted in our original post (below), the Arkansas Supreme Court has proposed a set of rule changes that abolish the abstracting and addendum requirement.  In the original post, we promised to provide updates and more details, so we’re doing that now. Before delving into those details, please note that these are proposed revisions, so they are subject to change.  However, if you can get your record in electronic format, you may participate in a pilot project using these rules.  So, with that said, here are the major changes (and, of course, review the per curiam before filing your brief; this is just a general overview):

The Biggest Change: Abolition of the Abstracting and Addendum Requirement

This, of course, is the biggest change.  Attorneys are no longer required to prepare an abstract or an addendum.  Rather, attorneys will refer to the relevant page number in the record.  As mentioned below, the record will now be comprised of two separate portions: a pleading portion and a transcript portion.  If you cite to the pleading portion of the record, use the format (RP 10), and if you cite to the transcript portion, use the format (RT 10).  The court has a computer program that converts those citations to links to the relevant portion of the record.

Preparation and Filing of the Record

As mentioned above, there will now be two portions of the record: pleadings and transcripts.  The record must be in electronic format (PDF), and each portion of the record must be sequentially numbered such that the first page of the PDF is the first page of the record.  This means that whatever the first page of the PDF is (cover page, table of contents, etc.), it must be page 1.Under the proposed rule, attorneys are still responsible for filing the record, but unlike in the past, the record can now be filed electronically.  

Brief Components

In addition to the elimination of the abstract and addendum, the informational statement (the form that included questions about the appeal and the brief) has been eliminated.  The jurisdictional statement has more specific requirements under the proposed rule than under the current rule.  There are also a couple of new sections: a request for relief and a certificate of compliance with Administrative Order No. 19 (relating to confidential information) and with the word-count limitations (discussed in more detail below).  Finally, the “statement of the case” has been replaced with the “statement of the case and facts.”  

Length Limitations

There are two significant changes to the length of the brief.  First, rather than limiting the statement of the case to a certain number of pages and the argument to a certain number of pages, the limitation is a global limitation that can be allocated in whatever way makes the most sense.  Second, the limitation is converted to a word limit, rather than a page limit. The word count includes the jurisdictional statement, the statement of the case and the facts, the argument, and the request for relief. All other portions of the brief are disregarded for purposes of the word count. Here are the limits:

Brief TypeWord Count Limit
Appellant’s Brief8,600
Appellee’s Brief8,600
Reply Brief2,875
Appellee’s/Cross-Appellant’s Brief14,325
Reply/Cross-Appellee’s Brief11,475

 

ORIGINAL POST

As Justice Rhonda Wood described it on Twitter, there was some “HUGE” news from the Arkansas Supreme Court this morning:

Arkansas Supreme Court

We’re still reading the per curiam, and it’s full of changes, 

but here’s a brief synopsis (you can expect a more detailed examination later).

 

First, effective immediately, attorneys may begin requesting electronic records from the circuit clerk, and the circuit clerk is required to provide the record in electronic format.

Second, the Arkansas Supreme Court published for comment revisions to the rules that accommodate these electronic records.  Those rules abolish the requirements of an abstract and addendum.  

Third—and here’s the best part—even though those rules are currently only published for comment (meaning they are not in effect yet), attorneys who choose to file their records electronically are permitted to file under the new rules as part of a pilot project.

As the Supreme Court noted in its per curiam, the abstracting requirement (and, to a lesser extent, the addendum requirement) had outlived their usefulness.  In our opinion, the abstract adds needless time and expense (both in attorney’s fees and printing costs) to the appellate process, it is confusing, and even a well-done abstract can’t effectively capture what occurred at trial.  This is a good move, and we look forward to seeing it fully implemented.  And you can rest assured that we will never order another paper record again!

You’ve Got To Name It To Claim It: Barton v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

~ Andy Taylor

In Barton v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019 Ark. App. 239, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights to her three children. In doing so, the Court of Appeals gave an example of just how specific they expect objections to be at trial.

One of the pieces of evidence used against the mother in Barton was a psychological evaluation that recommended that the mother could not care for the children by herself. In the order terminating parental rights, the circuit court specifically stated that it had relied, at least in part, on the psychological evaluation.

On appeal, the mother argued that the psychological evaluation was inadmissible hearsay. The mother’s attorney had objected at trial, stating: “I will object unless the psychologist testifies,” and “[I]t’s my position that the psychologist needs to be here to testify.” Nevertheless, the Arkansas Court of Appeals refused to address the issue.

In refusing the address the issue, the Court of Appeals held that this objection was “vague.” Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that this objection could have been a hearsay objection, but it also could have been an authentication objection or a right-to-cross-examine objection.

This case shows the importance of being as specific as possible when raising objections. In fact, it is quite possible that this is one of those instances where everyone in the courtroom knew and understood what the objection was about, but it’s just not reflected in the record. Because Arkansas appellate courts are often very strict about objections, we always urge extreme caution when trying to preserve an objection for appeal.

Creating Hyperlinks in Adobe

~ Andy Taylor

One of the questions we receive quite frequently is about creating hyperlinks to the sections of a brief.  With electronic filing of briefs now required, and with hyperlinks required as part of electronic filing, this is something every attorney filing appellate briefs in Arkansas must know.

We’ve put together a short set of instructions for hyperlinking.  For this example, we are using the Supreme Court’s model brief.  We use Adobe Acrobat Pro DC, but any modern PDF editing program (such as Foxit PhantomPDF; Nuance Power PDF) has the same functionality, and works basically the same way.

Step 1: Open the Hyperlinks Toolbar

In the “Find Your Tools Here” box (which is in the upper right-hand corner), type “link.”

Creating Hyperlinks in Arkansas Appellate Briefs - Step 1

Continue reading “Creating Hyperlinks in Adobe” →

The Arkansas Court of Appeals Holds that Sanctions and Contempt Are Not the Same

~ Andy Taylor

The Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil provide that “[a]n appeal may be taken from a circuit court to the Arkansas Supreme Court from . . . [a] civil or criminal contempt order, which imposes a sanction and constitutes the final disposition of the contempt matter.” Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(13).  But what about an order that imposes sanctions, but doesn’t hold anyone in civil or criminal contempt?

In Hancook Tire Co., LTD v. Philpot, 2016 Ark. App. 386, the parties were involved in an ongoing discovery dispute.  Eventually, the plaintiff (Philpot) filed a “Motion for Sanctions for Spoliation and Concealment of Evidence.”  A hearing was held on the motion, and the trial court eventually issued a letter opinion in which it stated that, because of “the multiple hearings that have been necessitated because of the Defendants obtuse and unnecessary abuse of the discovery process,” the trial court would impose Rule 37 sanctions (in the form of attorney’s fees) “to deter any future similar conduct.”

The trial court then entered an order awarding a total of $43,025 in attorney’s fees because Hankook’s “conduct in obstructing discovery has been egregious . . . . [and] to deter further such obstruction of discovery in this matter.”  In the order, the trial court stated that “[t]his Order is a final Order for purposes of appeal.” A purported Rule 54(b) certificate appeared at the end of the order.  (The Rule 54(b) certificate was rejected by the Court of Appeals in this case because it merely tracked the language of the rule, rather than making specific factual findings; we have previously blogged on this topic, and so therefore will not go into detail on that issue in this blog post.)

The question in the Hancock case is whether an order that imposes sanctions rises to the level of an order of contempt that would make that order a final order for purposes of appeal.  In Hancook, the Court of Appeals held that such an order was not an appealable order.  Specifically, the Court of Appeals held as follows:

Hankook’s notice of appeal cited to the contempt-with-sanctions provision as the basis to invoke appellate jurisdiction, but the trial court here did not hold Hankook “in contempt,” although it could have so determined as an appropriate sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(D).  Rather, the trial court here entered an order for attorney fees for discovery obstruction.  This is not a final, appealable order.

This distinction is a fine line, so counsel must be careful when making the decision whether or not to file a notice of appeal from an order imposing sanctions.  It would appear that had the order simply added a few words (stating that one of the parties or counsel was being held “in contempt”), this order would have been considered a final, and, therefore, appealable order.  This is yet another reason that it is vital for counsel to closely and carefully read every order before deciding whether or not to file a notice of appeal from that order.

A cautionary note is in order, however.  As we have mentioned before, in light of the opinion in Massinelli v. Massinelli, 2016 Ark. App. 90 (and the cases upon which it relied), counsel should always be cautious about deciding not to file a notice of appeal from an order that is arguably final, even if it appears to be nonfinal.

The Arkansas Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard for Terminating Consensual Guardianships of Minors

~ Andy Taylor

Suppose a mother consented to a guardianship of her child because she had a drug problem and was seeking treatment.1 Now suppose the mother, after putting her life back together, walks into your office and wants to terminate the guardianship. What standard applies to her petition to terminate the guardianship? This article attempts
to answer that question.

The Arkansas statute governing guardianships provides that “[a] guardianship may be terminated by court order . . . [if] . . . the guardianship is no longer necessary or for the best interest of the ward.”2 While this statute might appear to be straightforward, there have been four major Arkansas Supreme Court cases in the last six years or so dealing with this issue, each of them with a concurrence, a dissent, or both.

Some of the complexity arises because of a 2000 case from the Supreme Court of the United States dealing with grandparent visitation. This article will begin with a short synopsis of that case, and then move to the evolution of this area of law in light of that opinion.

Troxel v. Granville: “There is a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests.”3

In Troxel v. Granville, the United States Supreme Court examined a Washington statute that allowed courts to award visitation of a child to any person if the visitation was in the best interest of the child. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it gave no deference to a parent’s decision regarding visitation. The Court held that “[t]here is a presumption that fit parents act in their children’s best interests.”

Although the Troxel decision would eventually become important in termination of consensual guardianship cases in Arkansas, the first major Arkansas case on point that began to move the needle in favor of parental rights did so without relying on Troxel.

Continue reading “The Arkansas Supreme Court Clarifies the Standard for Terminating Consensual Guardianships of Minors” →

In Memory of Chief Justice Hannah

~ Tasha C. Taylor

The Arkansas Supreme Court issued a per curiam last week entitled In Memory of Chief Justice James R. Hannah, in which the Court recognized Justice Hannah’s 37 years of service to the Arkansas Judiciary.

I had the privilege and honor of starting my legal career at the Arkansas Supreme Court during the time when Chief Justice Hannah led the Court.  Much has been written about how he was an accomplished jurist, and rightfully so.  But, I was always most impressed by his gentle smile and soft voice with which he seemed to greet everyone he met.  It’s no wonder he was such a remarkable leader who aspired for a system of justice where all people would receive the same level of treatment.

“We have the best judicial system in the world. But if a person cannot walk through those courtroom doors because of their economic status or race, then having the best judicial system means absolutely nothing.” – Chief Justice Jim Hannah, June 2010.

* Hat tip to Amy Dunn Johnson for sharing the above quote and link to the following video where Justice Hannah speaks about access to justice during his first “State of the Judiciary Address” at the 2010 annual meeting of the Arkansas Bar Association.

 

Another Post-Judgment Motion Cautionary Tale: Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Kolesar

~ Andy Taylor ~ 1 Comment

We have discussed the dangers of post-trial motions in a previous blog post.  In fact, in a CLE we presented to the Arkansas Trial Lawyers Association in 2011, we listed the filing of a post-trial motion as one of the “Top Five Ways to Wreck Your Next Appeal.”  Fellow blogger Tim Cullen recently discussed the same problem in a blog post discussing Virgil v. Morgan, 2013 Ark. App. 675, and also recommended avoiding post-trial motions unless absolutely necessary.  Now, Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Kolesar, 2013 Ark. App. 723, gives us yet another reason to avoid post-trial motions.

Kolesar is a nursing home negligence case.  The plaintiff, who had been a resident of the nursing home for approximately eight months in 2009, filed suit against the nursing home on December 2, 2010.  On January 3, 2011, the nursing home removed the case to federal court and filed an answer that, among other things, reserved the right to enforce any applicable arbitration agreement.  On April 15, 2011, the federal court remanded the case back to state court.

After the case was remanded back to state court, the nursing home filed a motion to compel arbitration, based on its allegation that the resident’s husband had signed an arbitration agreement on the resident’s behalf.  The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion (there was a dispute as to whether the husband had actually signed the agreement, and as to whether he was acting as her agent at the time), and at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.

On May 21, 2012, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to compel arbitration, with the order stating that the decision had been announced in open court.  Eight days later (May 29, 2012), the nursing home filed a motion seeking specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Because the trial court never ruled on the motion, the motion was deemed denied on June 28, 2012, and the nursing home filed its Notice of Appeal on July 20, 2012.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals raised, sua sponte, the issue of timeliness of the Notice of Appeal, and dismissed the appeal.

Rule 4(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil governs when a post-trial motion extends the time to file a Notice of Appeal.  Under that rule, the following motions extend the period during which to file a notice of appeal:

a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under Rule 50(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to amend the court’s findings of fact or to make additional findings under Rule 52(b), a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a), or any other motion to vacate, alter, or amend the judgment made no later than 10 days after entry of judgment . . . .

The question, then, was whether the nursing home’s motion fit into one of these categories and, more specifically, whether it qualified as “a motion to amend the court’s findings of fact or to make additional findings under Rule 52(b).”  Based on the language of Rule 52(b), the Court of Appeals held that the motion in this case did not fall into this category, holding instead that the nursing home’s motion was a Rule 52(a) motion.

Rule 52(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

If requested by a party at any time prior to entry of judgment in all contested actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58 . . . .  Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review . . . .  If an opinion memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein.

Rule 52(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:

Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, the court may amend its findings of fact or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly…. If the court neither grants nor denies the motion within 30 days of the date on which it is filed or treated as filed, it shall be deemed denied as of the 30th day.

Relying in part on Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Dix, 94 Ark. App. 139, 227 S.W.3d 456 (2006), the Court of Appeals pointed out the differences between the two types of motions.  A Rule 52(a) motion must be filed before a judgment is entered, while a Rule 52(b) motion may be filed up to ten days after a judgment is entered.  A Rule 52(a) motion is mandatory on the trial court, while a Rule 52(b) motion is not.  The Court of Appeals also noted that Rule 52(a) anticipates that a trial court would state its facts and conclusions of law, while Rule 52(b) anticipates that a trial court would amend its findings of fact or make additional findings of fact.

The Court of Appeals held that the motion in Kolesar was a Rule 52(a) motion, in spite of the fact that the nursing home cited Rule 52(b) in its motion, and in spite of the fact that it was filed 10 days after the entry of the order denying the motion to compel arbitration.  The Court of Appeals noted that there had been no findings of fact by the trial court, so there were no findings to amend under Rule 52(b).  In addition, the nursing home’s motion sought “specific findings of fact and conclusions of law,” language that is found in Rule 52(a), but not Rule 52(b).

Because the Court of Appeals held that this was a Rule 52(a) motion, the deadline for the nursing home to file a Notice of Appeal was not extended, meaning that the Notice of Appeal would have been due 30 days after May 21, 2012.

The opinion in Kolesar was written by Judge Gladwin and joined by Judge Walmsley, and a concurring opinion was written by Judge Gruber.  In her concurrence, Judge Gruber acknowledged that the decision is correct, but she expressed concern about the outcome.  She indicated that in this case, the outcome was not too harsh because it simply meant that the case would go to trial rather than be arbitrated.  She expressed concern, however, that there could be “a harsh result under slightly different circumstances,” and suggested that the Arkansas Supreme Court revisit Rule 52.

This case is yet another example of why, generally speaking, a post-trial motion simply is not worth the risk.  There is not much upside (trial courts often don’t rule on them anyway, causing them to be deemed denied, and when they do rule on them, they often “bullet-proof” their earlier order), but there is a lot of downside.  Therefore, our general recommendation is to avoid post-trial motions unless absolutely necessary.