Category: Arkansas Family Law Appeals

Hallelujah! (In other words, the Arkansas Supreme Court is abolishing the abstract and addendum requirement.)

Arkansas Justice Building--Home of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Arkansas Court of Appeals
~ Andy Taylor

As we noted in our original post (below), the Arkansas Supreme Court has proposed a set of rule changes that abolish the abstracting and addendum requirement.  In the original post, we promised to provide updates and more details, so we’re doing that now. Before delving into those details, please note that these are proposed revisions, so they are subject to change.  However, if you can get your record in electronic format, you may participate in a pilot project using these rules.  So, with that said, here are the major changes (and, of course, review the per curiam before filing your brief; this is just a general overview):

The Biggest Change: Abolition of the Abstracting and Addendum Requirement

This, of course, is the biggest change.  Attorneys are no longer required to prepare an abstract or an addendum.  Rather, attorneys will refer to the relevant page number in the record.  As mentioned below, the record will now be comprised of two separate portions: a pleading portion and a transcript portion.  If you cite to the pleading portion of the record, use the format (RP 10), and if you cite to the transcript portion, use the format (RT 10).  The court has a computer program that converts those citations to links to the relevant portion of the record.

Preparation and Filing of the Record

As mentioned above, there will now be two portions of the record: pleadings and transcripts.  The record must be in electronic format (PDF), and each portion of the record must be sequentially numbered such that the first page of the PDF is the first page of the record.  This means that whatever the first page of the PDF is (cover page, table of contents, etc.), it must be page 1.Under the proposed rule, attorneys are still responsible for filing the record, but unlike in the past, the record can now be filed electronically.  

Brief Components

In addition to the elimination of the abstract and addendum, the informational statement (the form that included questions about the appeal and the brief) has been eliminated.  The jurisdictional statement has more specific requirements under the proposed rule than under the current rule.  There are also a couple of new sections: a request for relief and a certificate of compliance with Administrative Order No. 19 (relating to confidential information) and with the word-count limitations (discussed in more detail below).  Finally, the “statement of the case” has been replaced with the “statement of the case and facts.”  

Length Limitations

There are two significant changes to the length of the brief.  First, rather than limiting the statement of the case to a certain number of pages and the argument to a certain number of pages, the limitation is a global limitation that can be allocated in whatever way makes the most sense.  Second, the limitation is converted to a word limit, rather than a page limit. The word count includes the jurisdictional statement, the statement of the case and the facts, the argument, and the request for relief. All other portions of the brief are disregarded for purposes of the word count. Here are the limits:

Brief TypeWord Count Limit
Appellant’s Brief8,600
Appellee’s Brief8,600
Reply Brief2,875
Appellee’s/Cross-Appellant’s Brief14,325
Reply/Cross-Appellee’s Brief11,475

 

ORIGINAL POST

As Justice Rhonda Wood described it on Twitter, there was some “HUGE” news from the Arkansas Supreme Court this morning:

Arkansas Supreme Court

We’re still reading the per curiam, and it’s full of changes, 

but here’s a brief synopsis (you can expect a more detailed examination later).

 

First, effective immediately, attorneys may begin requesting electronic records from the circuit clerk, and the circuit clerk is required to provide the record in electronic format.

Second, the Arkansas Supreme Court published for comment revisions to the rules that accommodate these electronic records.  Those rules abolish the requirements of an abstract and addendum.  

Third—and here’s the best part—even though those rules are currently only published for comment (meaning they are not in effect yet), attorneys who choose to file their records electronically are permitted to file under the new rules as part of a pilot project.

As the Supreme Court noted in its per curiam, the abstracting requirement (and, to a lesser extent, the addendum requirement) had outlived their usefulness.  In our opinion, the abstract adds needless time and expense (both in attorney’s fees and printing costs) to the appellate process, it is confusing, and even a well-done abstract can’t effectively capture what occurred at trial.  This is a good move, and we look forward to seeing it fully implemented.  And you can rest assured that we will never order another paper record again!

You’ve Got To Name It To Claim It: Barton v. Arkansas Department of Human Services

~ Andy Taylor

In Barton v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2019 Ark. App. 239, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a circuit court’s termination of a mother’s parental rights to her three children. In doing so, the Court of Appeals gave an example of just how specific they expect objections to be at trial.

One of the pieces of evidence used against the mother in Barton was a psychological evaluation that recommended that the mother could not care for the children by herself. In the order terminating parental rights, the circuit court specifically stated that it had relied, at least in part, on the psychological evaluation.

On appeal, the mother argued that the psychological evaluation was inadmissible hearsay. The mother’s attorney had objected at trial, stating: “I will object unless the psychologist testifies,” and “[I]t’s my position that the psychologist needs to be here to testify.” Nevertheless, the Arkansas Court of Appeals refused to address the issue.

In refusing the address the issue, the Court of Appeals held that this objection was “vague.” Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that this objection could have been a hearsay objection, but it also could have been an authentication objection or a right-to-cross-examine objection.

This case shows the importance of being as specific as possible when raising objections. In fact, it is quite possible that this is one of those instances where everyone in the courtroom knew and understood what the objection was about, but it’s just not reflected in the record. Because Arkansas appellate courts are often very strict about objections, we always urge extreme caution when trying to preserve an objection for appeal.

Child Visitation Order Not Final Where Contempt and Child Support Issues Were Left Undecided

~ Andy Taylor

If you’ve followed this blog for very long, one of the topics that arises quite frequently is the issue of whether or not an order is a final, appealable order.  This question often arises in family law cases, because there are so many moving parts in those cases.  The decision of the Arkansas Court of Appeals in John v. Bolinder, 2016 Ark. App. 357, provides an example of such a case.

In John, an unmarried couple had one child together in 2010.  In 2012, the trial court awarded primary custody to mom, with dad to have visitation (one week per month plus extended summer visitation) and also to pay child support.  In 2014, the trial court modified the order to decrease dad’s nonsummer visitation to one weekend per month.

In late 2014, dad filed a motion for release of mom’s medical and psychological records.  A few months later, dad filed a motion to modify child support, confirm the length of summer visitation, or modify the summer visitation.  Dad also requested that his summer visitation be expanded, and that child support be reduced during the summer visitation.

At some point during this timeline, mom filed a motion for contempt against dad.  A hearing was held on these matter in May of 2015, at which hearing the parties mentioned that this contempt motion was unresolved.

In June 2015, the trial court entered an order denying dad’s motion seeking the medical/psychological records and denying the motion to modify summer visitation (although the trial court did slightly modify the summer visitation schedule).  The order did not address mom’s contempt motion, and it specifically reserved the issue of child support.

The question, then, is whether an order deciding visitation is final in a situation where a contempt motion and a motion to modify child support are outstanding.  Dad argued that these issues (contempt and child support) were merely collateral matters not affecting the finality of the order.  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, relying on two cases: Burton v. Templeman, 2015 Ark. App. 101 (holding that an order denying a motion to modify visitation was not final where it specifically reserved a ruling on a motion for contempt) and Mitchell v. Mitchell,  98 Ark. App. 47, 249 S.W.3d 847 (2007) (holding that an order on “various post-divorce disputes” was not final where it specifically reserved a ruling on child support).

In light of this decision, there are two things to keep in mind when deciding whether to file a notice of appeal from a decision involving child custody and visitation.  First, keep in mind that had the facts been slightly different, this order likely would have been a final order pursuant to Rule 2(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-Civil, which provides that “[a]ll final orders awarding custody are final appealable orders.”  Second, in light of the opinion in Massinelli v. Massinelli, 2016 Ark. App. 90 (and the cases upon which it relied), counsel should always be cautious about deciding not to file a notice of appeal from an order that is arguably final, even if it appears to be nonfinal.  The best option in this situation would probably be to try to obtain a Rule 54(b) certification to any order that leaves unfinished business.

Arkansas Supreme Court Decision Clarifies Rule Regarding Termination of Consensual Guardianship, but Some Questions Remain

~ Andy Taylor ~ 1 Comment

In re Guardianship of S.H., 2012 Ark. 245, 409 S.W.3d 307 (“S.H. I“) and In re Guardianship of S.H., 2015 Ark. 75 (“S.H. II“) both address the rule that applies when a parent who originally consents to a guardianship later seeks to terminate the guardianship.  In S.H. I (decided in 2012), the Arkansas Supreme Court set forth a two-step burden shifting analysis for determining whether to terminate a guardianship in such situations.  In S.H. II (which was the second appeal of the same case, decided in February 2015), the Arkansas Supreme Court clarified the burdens of proof that apply to each step in the analysis.  S.H. II was a split opinion, however, and for reasons that will be discussed in more detail below, there is some question as to which rule will apply in the future.  Therefore, this blog post analyzes the rule from both the majority opinion (which technically appears to be a plurality opinion) and the concurring opinion, along with a note regarding which rule might apply in the future.

I. Legal Background

SH II addresses situations where a parent consents to another person (typically a family member) serving as the guardian of his or her child, and then later that parent seeks to terminate that guardianship.  This can arise in a number of circumstances, such as when a parent must leave the country to serve in the military (Witham v. Beck, 2013 Ark. App. 351) or when a parent is overcoming a drug problem (Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 2012 Ark. App. 695).

A. Abolition of the Material Change in Circumstances Standard

For many years, appellate courts in Arkansas had “equate[d] a petition to terminate a guardianship to a change of child custody among natural parents.” Smith v. Thomas, 373 Ark. 427, 432, 284 S.W.3d 476, 479 (2008).  As a result, in order for a parent to terminate a guardianship, the parent was required to prove that there had been a material change in circumstances. Graham v. Matheny, 2009 Ark. 481, 6, 346 S.W.3d 273, 277 (2009).  In Graham, the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized that “there is confusion regarding the standard to be used in termination-of-guardianship cases.” Id. at 14, 346 S.W.3d at 280-81.  Therefore, the Arkansas Supreme Court took the opportunity to set forth five principles that apply in termination of guardianship cases.  Perhaps the most significant of those principles was that “a change-of-custody analysis using the material-change-of-circumstances standard should not be done in termination-of-guardianship cases.” Id. at 15, 346 S.W.3d at 281.

The Court in Graham noted that the guardianship statute, which provides that “[a] guardianship may be terminated by court order . . . [if] the guardianship is no longer necessary or for the best interest of the ward,” is a disjunctive test. See Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-401(b)(3).  Nevertheless, the Arkansas Supreme Court still held that even if there is evidence that a guardianship is no longer necessary, the best interests of the child must still be examined.  The concurrence in Graham, written by Justice Hannah, joined by Justice Danielson, made the point that the statute is a disjunctive statate and argued that “[u]pon remand, the circuit court should be ordered to determine whether if for any reason, the guardianship is no longer necessary or for some other reason it is no longer in the best interest of [the ward] that the guardianship continue.” Graham, 2009 Ark. 481, at 19, 346 S.W.3d at 283 (Hannah, C.J., concurring).

The concurrence, in a footnote, made one other point: That the parties had not raised the question of whether the guardianship statute as written violated parents’ constitutional rights to the custody and control of children. Id. at 18, 346 S.W.3d at 282 (Hannah, C.J., concurring).  Specifically, the concurrence made reference to Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 Sup. Ct. 2054 (2000), in which the Arkansas Supreme Court had held in a grandparent visitation case that “there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children.”  The Arkansas Supreme Court had also recognized this principle in a grandparent visitation case, holding that “a fit parent is given a presumption that he or she is acting in a child’s best interests.” Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002).

Less than three years after the decision in Graham v. Metheny was handed down, the Arkansas Supreme Court would address head-on the issue of parental rights in the context of a termination of a consensual guardianship.

Continue reading “Arkansas Supreme Court Decision Clarifies Rule Regarding Termination of Consensual Guardianship, but Some Questions Remain” →

Temporary Custody Orders Not Appealable (And a Note of Caution)

~ Andy Taylor

Strother v. Strother

In Strother v. Strother, 2015 Ark. App. 196, the Arkansas Court of Appeals recently held that a decree that “does not contain a final award of custody” is not an appealable order.  A review of Strother, along with several other cases on this topic, reveals that the line between a final custody order and a temporary custody order is not always clear, so attorneys should be cautious before choosing not to appeal from what might appear to be a temporary custody order.

In Strother, the dad and mom had married in 2001, and the mom had filed for divorce in 2013.  In her complaint for divorce, the mom sought joint legal custody, with her having primary physical custody.  The court appointed an attorney ad litem, and eventually held a hearing “on the divorce and custody issues.”  The court then issued a letter opinion in which it granted the couple joint legal custody, and granted the mom primary physical custody.

With respect to custody issues, the circuit court’s order stated as follows:

[T]his court finds that the aforesaid orders of this court in regards [to] custody and other issues concerning the aforesaid two (2) minor children are temporary in nature; that an attorney ad litem will be appointed to represent the aforesaid two (2) minor children; that Defendant shall be solely responsible for payment of all attorney fees and expenses which will [be] owed to the attorney ad litem; and that issues concerning permanent orders in regard [to] custody and other issues concerning the aforesaid two (2) minor children will be determined in the future by agreement of the parties or by order of the court.

The Court of Appeals in this case examined whether this was an appealable order.  Rule 2(d) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil provides that “[a]ll final orders awarding custody are final appealable orders.”  In other words, even if an order granting divorce isn’t otherwise considered a final order, if the order is final with respect to custody, then it will be final for purposes of appealing the custody determination.

In Strother, the Court of Appeals held that the order was not a “final order[] awarding custody.”  The Court of Appeals noted that “the order specifically states that issues of custody ‘are temporary in nature’ and that ‘issues concerning permanent orders in regard [to] custody . . . will be determined in the future.'”  Therefore, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal until a final custody award is entered.

In its opinion in Strother, the Court of Appeals cited to an Arkansas Supreme Court case, Gilbert v. Moore, 364 Ark. 127, 216 S.W.3d 583 (2005).  In that case, the trial court had entered an emergency ex parte order granting temporary custody of the couple’s child to the father.  Four days later, the trial court held a short hearing and ordered the custody of the child remain with the father, and that the mother was to receive weekend visitation.  The trial court stated from the bench:

I signed an Ex Parte Order a few days ago which placed the temporary custody in the Plaintiff, the father. I really don’t know where this child is better off long term. I guess that’s something that is going to have to be resolved at a later date. I presume both of these parties want long term custody of this child. I may or may not be right about that. In the meantime I’m going to leave the Ex Parte Order in effect; however, the child shall spend each weekend with his mother beginning 6:00 p.m. on Friday and ending on 6:00 p.m. on Sunday. And when counsel and the parties are ready for this case to be heard in its entirety on its merits thoroughly by myself or somebody, probably somebody else, and hopefully make the right decision on where this child should grow up, then that’s what will happen.

The trial court went on to state from the bench that the order would be “on a temporary basis the child should stay with the father during the week and the mother during the weekends until this case can be resolved on its merits.”  The order itself was not quite as specific as to the temporary nature of the order, but did state that custody would remain with the father “at this time.”

In Gilbert, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the custody order was a temporary order and therefore not appealable.  This, however, is where the note of caution comes in.  The Arkansas Supreme Court held that “[w]hether a custody order is final or temporary is not dependent upon the style of the order,” and that “custody orders styled as temporary may be nonetheless final for purposes of appeal if the issue of custody was decided on the merits and the parties have completed their proof.”  In Gilbert, the basis of the holding appears to have been that “the issue of custody ha[d] yet to be determined on its merits and . . . the parties ha[d] not completed their proof on the issue.”

This seems to be consistent with previous cases cited by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Gilbert.  Although those cases predate the addition of “final orders awarding custody” to the list of appealable orders (that amendment was adopted in 1999), the holdings are still informative.  In those three cases, the key issue seems to whether there has been a final hearing on the merits.  In Sandlin v. Sandlin, for example, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the order in that case was not appealable because “the main issue, that of custody,” had not been decided. 290 Ark. 366, 719 S.W.2d 433 (1986).  The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that it had previously held that “there can be no appeal . . . until the proof has been completed and the order entered.” Similarly, in Jones v. Jones, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that a custody order “is final for purposes of appeal if the the issue of custody was decided on the merits and the parties have completed their proof.” 41 Ark. App. 146, 852 S.W.2d 325 (1993).

In Chancellor v. Chancellor, 282 Ark. 227, 667 S.W.2d 950 (1984), the Arkansas Supreme Court held, based on the following, that the custody order was not final:

The record reflects that appellant has not yet completed her proof. The order in the present case did not terminate any cause or right, dismiss any party from the action or conclude their rights. By its very terms it is a temporary order. The court ordered an investigation of the respective homes and ordered that a report be made to the court. It is obvious the court did not intend to take final action on this matter based solely upon the fact that the mother may be living in adultery.

This brings us back to Strother.  In that case, it appears that there had, in fact, been a hearing on the merits.  The order, however, appears to have left custody open until an attorney ad litem could be appointed and could report back to the court.  In that sense, the issue of custody was still open.

The Takeaway

Based on these cases, attorneys should never assume that a custody order is temporary based solely on the fact that the order is styled as a “temporary” order. These cases make clear that there’s more to the analysis than simply what the order is styled.  Sometimes, it might not be entirely clear to counsel whether or not a custody order constitutes a “final order[] awarding custody.”  In those situations, the best course of action is probably to file a notice of appeal as a precaution.  Otherwise, the attorney risks allowing what appears to be a temporary order become a permanent, nonappealable order.

Future Obligations and Finality Problems: Nix v. Nix

~ Andy Taylor

Nix v. Nix

The Arkansas Court of Appeals recently handed down its decision in Nix v. Nix, 2014 Ark. App. 162.   Nix was a divorce case in which the husband appealed, arguing that the trial court had erred: (1) in finding that a car was his wife’s nonmarital property; and (2) in failing to equitably divide his pension payments.  The Arkansas Court of Appeals was not able to reach the merits of the husband’s arguments, however, because of a finality problem with the order.

In Nix, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found two paragraphs in the divorce decree to be problematic.  The first problematic paragraph stated as follows:

The Court further finds that the parties owned certain real estate which constitutes the marital home. This property should be listed for sale immediately with an agreed upon realtor and listing price. The parties shall be equally responsible for the major repairs pending a sale however Ms. Nix will be responsible for any ordinary wear and tear and utilities. . . .

The second problematic paragraph stated as follows:

The Court finds that all of the property including but not limited to the Montana Fifth Wheel, the 2012 Arctic Cat, Ranger Boat motor and trailer all of which are on Schedule C are marital property. The parties shall have thirty days to reach an agreement regarding the division of marital personal property listed in Schedule C, otherwise the property shall be sold at private auction.

In holding that the divorce decree was not a final order, the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that “[s]everal matters have been left undecided between the parties.”  In particular, the Court of Appeals highlighted the following unresolved questions:

  • whether the husband and wife will agree on a realtor and listing price;
  • whether the husband and wife will agree on what constitutes a major repair and what constitutes ordinary wear and tear;
  • whether the husband and wife will reach an agreement regarding the remaining personal property; and
  • whether the husband and wife will agree on a date, place, and terms of sale for a private auction.

In reaching its conclusion that the divorce decree in Nix was not a final order, the Court of Appeals relied on Wadley v. Wadley, 2010 Ark. App. 733.  In Wadley, the divorce decree had provided as follows:

Unless otherwise specified herein, the parties shall have sixty (60) days from entry of this DECREE OF DIVORCE to agree upon a disposition of the remaining items of marital property. Any property division not agreed upon within the sixty (60) days shall be sold by public auction, with the parties responsible for hiring an auctioneer and advertising said sale. Any and all proceeds from the sale of the property, after the costs of the auctioneer and advertising shall be equally divided between the parties.

As in Nix, the court in Wadley had determined that there were simply too many unresolved questions left open by the order.  Therefore, the Court of Appeals had held that the order in Wadley was not a final order.

The Takeaway

There have been a number of cases lately dealing with finality, and although lack of a final order means that there is still the opportunity to appeal (once the final order is entered), there are still significant costs involved in having to rebrief a case. Therefore, the best option when attempting to pursue an appeal is to try to make certain that the trial court enters a final order.

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