Arkansas Supreme Court’s Procedural Ruling Has Practical Effect of Temporarily Stopping Same-Sex Marriages in Arkansas

Arkansas Supreme CourtLack of Final Order Prevents Arkansas Supreme Court from Issuing a Stay of Pulaski County Circuit Court’s Ruling in Same-Sex Marriage Case

The Arkansas Supreme Court handed down a decision late this afternoon dismissing without prejudice the appeal taken by the State from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s recent decision declaring Arkansas’s ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.

According to the per curiam decision, the circuit court’s order was not final because it failed to adjudicate all the claims or to otherwise include a Rule 54(b) certificate, which would allow an interlocutory appeal from an otherwise non-final order.

Arkansas Supreme Court Essentially Holds That a Stay is Unnecessary Because There is No Order Striking Down Licensing Statute

The Arkansas Supreme Court also denied the State’s plea for the Court to help alleviate confusion among circuit clerks by granting a stay pursuant to the Supreme Court’s superintending authority.  The Court noted that because the circuit court had not issued a ruling with respect to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-11-208(b) (Repl. 2009), “License not issued to persons of the same sex,” the circuit court’s order had no effect on that statute and its prohibition against circuit and county clerks issuing same-sex marriage licenses.

Although the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s decision struck down as unconstitutional two state statutes that ban marriages by people of the same sex (Arkansas Code Annotated Sections 9-11-107, “Validity of foreign marriages” and 9-11-109, “Same sex marriage void”), it failed to rule on Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-11-208(a)(1)(B), which provides, “A license shall not be issued to a person to marry another person of the same sex, and no same-sex marriage shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage.”  It appears that this means that that statute is still in effect, so the practical effect of this ruling appears to be that circuit clerks are prohibited from issuing licenses to same-sex couples until the circuit court clarifies its ruling.

The Court’s full decision is available here: Arkansas Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Decision.

Procedural Lessons from a $48 Million Dollar Appeal

On December 8, 2011, the Arkansas Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bayer Cropscience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518.  The Court’s decision is significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which are a couple of procedural issues that might be easily overlooked upon first glance in light of the Court’s holding overruling Arkansas’s punitive damages caps.

Punitive Damages Cap Declared Unconstitutional

“We hold that section 16-55-208 is unconstitutional under article 5, section 32 as it limits the amount of recovery outside the employment relationship.”

In a decision that affirmed a $48 million dollar judgment in favor of Arkansas rice farmers, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damage limitations contained in Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-208 are unconstitutional. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 12.

That statute, passed by the Arkansas General Assembly as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, provided for each plaintiff a cap on punitive damages in the amount of $250,000 or three times the amount of compensatory damages (not to exceed $1,000,000). See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-208.

In its opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court observed that the Arkansas Constitution gives the Arkansas General Assembly the power to limit the amount of recovery “only in matters arising between employer and employee.” Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 12.  Article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution, as amended by amended 26, provides the following:

The General Assembly shall have the power to enact laws prescribing the amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries to or death of employees, and to whom said payment shall be made.  It shall have power to provide the means, methods, and forum for adjudicating claims arising under said laws, and for securing payment of the same. Provided that otherwise no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property; and in case of death from such injuries the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such action shall be prosecuted.

Ark. Const art. 5, § 32.

On appeal, Bayer argued that article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution referred only to compensatory damages and not to punitive damages.  The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, disagreed: “Although compensatory and punitive damages serve differing purposes, an award of punitive damages is nonetheless an integrant part of ‘the amount recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property.’” Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 12 (quoting Ark. Const art. 5, § 32).  Accordingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that section 16-55-208 is unconstitutional under the Arkansas Constitution because it limits the amount of recover outside the employment relationship, which is expressly prohibited by article 5, section 32.

Possible Departure from Arkansas’s Strict Preservation Rules?

The ruling on the punitive damages caps is monumental in and of itself, but what makes it even more interesting is the Court’s analysis of how it was able to reach the merits of that decision, which was an issue that split the Court 6-1.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Karen Baker explained that while she agrees with the outcome reached by the majority, she would not have reached the merits of the constitutionality of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-208 because she did not believe that issue was preserved for appellate review. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 24–25 (Baker, J., Concurring).  Justice Baker argued that because the circuit court ruled on the constitutionality of that statute from the bench and entered no written opinion concerning that issue, it was not preserved for appellate review. Id.  In support of her opinion, Justice Baker cited to a number of cases in which the Arkansas Supreme Court has previously declined to rule on constitutional issues that had been ruled on from the bench only and that had not been included in the written orders. See, e.g., Boellner v. Clinical Study Ctrs., LLP, 2011 Ark. 83, at 23, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (holding that the constitutional issue presented in that case was not preserved for appellate review because “[a]lthough the circuit court ruled on this issue from the bench, the final, written order did not address this issue.”).

In footnote 5, Justice Courtney Hudson Goodson, writing for the majority, responded to Justice Baker’s concurring opinion concerning the issue of the constitutionality of the punitive damages cap: “Despite the concurring justice’s protestations to the contrary, it is without question that the issue concerning the constitutionality of the statutory cap on punitive damages is preserved for appeal.”  Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 14 n.5.  In this case, the constitutional issue was raised in a pretrial motion and discussed in a hearing, at which time the circuit court orally declared from the bench that the statute in question was unconstitutional.  According to the Arkansas Supreme Court, its preservation rules “require nothing more.”  Id.

The majority went on to explain that “[a]lthough considered the better practice for a circuit court to explain its decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary with regard to decisions on motions.” (emphasis added). Id.  In footnote 5, the majority further explained that if the concurrence was correct in its view, then the Court would also have been precluded from reaching the merits of the circuit court’s decisions in a couple of other issues regarding motions in this appeal, as the circuit court also disposed of those other motions by ruling from the bench. Id.  The Court’s conclusion is that “the circuit court’s failure to specify the ground upon which it found the statute unconstitutional does not deter us from performing our duty to review the circuit court’s decision.” Id.

Although couched as a decision rooted in precedent, Justice Baker seemed to view the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision to reach the merits of the constitutional issue in this case as a departure from the Court’s strict preservation rules.  It will be interesting to see whether the Schafer preservation rule is followed by the Court in decisions to come.  Regardless of whether it is cited in future decisions, there can be no doubt that it will be cited in numerous appellant’s briefs in the months and years to come.

Perfecting the Notice of Appeal in Light of Posttrial Motions

“A notice of appeal must be judged by what it recites and not what it was intended to recite.” 

Among other arguments on appeal, Bayer also challenged the $42,000,000 punitive damages award as excessive under the U.S. Constitution.  The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to reach this issue because it held that it was not preserved for appellate review. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 23.

Bayer made its arguments to the circuit court concerning the excessiveness of the damages award in its posttrial motion for new trial and remittitur. Id.  Because the circuit court did not take action on the posttrial motion within the 30-day window allowed pursuant to Rule 4(b)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure—Civil, that motion was deemed denied at the expiration of the 30-day period. Id. at 23–24.  When the Bayer defendants filed their notices of appeal (all of which were identical), they failed to state in the notices of appeal that the appeal was being sought from both the judgment that was entered as well as the denial of the motion for new trial and remittitur. Id.  The Arkansas Supreme Court held that it is necessary to file a notice of appeal from the denial of the posttrial motion in order to appeal from the issues raised therein. Id. at 24.  According to the Court, unless the notice of appeal references both the final judgment and the deemed-denied ruling, the only appealable matter will be the original order. Id.

The following is a timeline of the post-trial procedural events that occurred in this case:

  • May 5—Judgment Entered
  • May 19—Bayer timely filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur.
  • June 18—Motions deemed denied.
  • July 19—Each Bayer defendant filed separate and timely notices of appeal from the judgment entered on May 5, 2010.

See Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 8.

To have preserved this issue for appeal, each of the Bayer defendants could have explained in their notices of appeal that they were appealing from both the May 5th judgment and the lower court’s denial of its motion for new trial and remittitur in the notice of appeal it filed on July 19th.  Another option would have been to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the date the judgment was entered in this matter.  Then, following the deemed-denied date of June 18th, Bayer could have filed an amended notice of appeal within 30 days of June 18th that indicated that it was appealing from both the May 5th judgment and the denial of its motion for new trial and remittitur.

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Arkansas Supreme Court Rules Act 1 Unconstitutional

The Arkansas Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision handed down this morning, affirmed the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s decision ruling that Act 1 is unconstitutional as a violation of fundamental privacy rights under the Arkansas Constitution.

The following is a link to the Court’s Decision: DHS v Cole Opinion

Act 1–also known as the Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act of 2008–was approved by Arkansas voters by a vote of 57% on November 4, 2008.  Act 1, which went into effect on January 1, 2009, prohibits an individual from adopting or serving as a foster parent if that individual is “cohabiting with a sexual partner outside of a marriage that is valid under the Arkansas Constitution and the laws of this state.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 9-8-304(b).  The prohibition on adoption and foster parenting “applies equally to cohabiting opposite-sex and same-sex individuals.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 9-8-304(b).

In today’s opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court announced its holding concerning the constitutionality of Act 1 as follows:

We hold that a fundamental right to privacy is at issue in this case and that, under the Arkansas Consitution, sexual cohabitors have the right to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial intimacy in the privacy of their homes.  We further hold that this right is jeopardized by Act 1 which precludes all sexual cohabitors, without exception, from eligibility for parenthood, whether by means of adoption or foster care. 

UPDATE: Arkansas Supreme Court Clarifies Original and Appellate Jurisdiction for Constitutional Amendments: Forrester v. Daniels.

UPDATE Below the Jump:

The Arkansas Supreme Court handed down its decision today in Forrester v. Daniels, clarifying that it has original jurisdiction over challenges to constitutional amendments that are initiated by the citizens, but appellate jurisdiction over challenges to constitutional amendments referred by the legislature. Forrester v. Daniels, 2010 Ark. 397.  This has been the rule for many years, but had been called into question after amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution became effective on July 1, 2001. See Becker v. McCuen, 303 Ark. 482, 708 S.W.2d 71 (1990).

Because the Court did not reach the merits of the Petitioner’s case, this blog post will not discuss the merits in detail, but will only address them briefly.  The proposed amendment at issue here deals with the maximum interest rate that can be charged by various entities, and also deals with the power of governmental units to issue bonds. Forrester, 2010 Ark. 397, at 2-4.  The gist of the challenge is that the legislature attempted to cover too many issues in a single proposed amendment.  Id. at 3-4.

The importance of this case, however, is more procedural in nature.  Because, as discussed above, the status of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction (original or appellate) was in doubt after the enactment of Amendment 80, the Petitioner filed nearly identical actions in the Pulaski County Circuit Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court, both on the same day.

A proposed constitutional amendment may appear on the ballot by one of two methods.  The first is by referral from the legislature, the requirements of which are provided in at Arkansas Constitution Article 19, § 22.  The second method is through the initiative and referendum power reserved to the people.  This procedure is outlined at Arkansas Constitution Amendment 7.

Amendment 7, dealing with amendments resulting from initiatives of the people, provides that “[t]he sufficiency of all state-wide petitions shall be decided in the first instance by the Secretary of State, subject to review by the Supreme Court of the State, which shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such causes.” Ark. Const. Amend. 7.  Article Nineteen, Section 22 of the Arkansas Constitution has no such provision, so the Arkansas Supreme Court in Becker held that it did not have original jurisdiction, but had only appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Article 7, § 4 of the Arkansas Constitution. See Becker, 303 Ark at 482, 708 S.w. 2d at 71.

The reason this is an issue in Forrester is that Article 7 was repealed by Amendment 80 of the Constitution.  Amendment 80 provides, in part, that “[t]he Supreme Court shall have . . . [o]riginal jurisdiction to determine sufficiency of state initiative and referendum petitions and proposed constitutional amendments.” Ark. Const. Amend. 80, § 2(D)(4).  Because the provision conferring original jurisdiction on the Arkansas Supreme Court includes the phrase “and proposed constitutional amendments,” the Petitioner argued that the Arkansas Supreme Court now has original jurisdiction over all proposed constitutional amendments, and not just those resulting from initiatives. See Forrester, supra.

In a unanimous opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed.  The Court held in Forrester that the phrase “and proposed constitutional amendments” must be read in the context of the phrase “to determine sufficiency of.” Forrester, 2010 Ark. 397, at 8-9.  According to the Court, that phrase only makes sense if “proposed constitutional amendments” refers only to amendments that result from initiatives from the people, as those are the only types of amendments subject to a sufficiency challenge. Id.  For proposed amendments referred from the legislature, the only question is “whether the procedures governing the method for the legislature to propose an amendment have been followed.” Id.

In an interesting paragraph at the end of the opinion, the Court then seemed to look at its own rules to help it interpret the constitutional issue.  The Court noted that it had amended its rules to conform to the changes resulting from Amendment 80.  After the changes, Rule 6-5 read as follows:

(a) Original Jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in extraordinary actions as required by law, such as suits attacking the validity of statewide petitions filed under Amendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution or, where the Supreme Court’s contempt powers are at issue.

Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-5(a) (2010).

In Forrester, the Court held its conclusion was “further bolstered” by the fact that it had amended the rules in response to Amendment 80, but had done so “in a way to indicate that our jurisdiction of the instant challenge is now original.” Id. at 9-10.  Arkansas appellate lawyers should bear this in mind when dealing with procedural issues before the Arkansas Supreme Court, as the Court seems willing to look to its own rules to help it interpret constitutional provisions.

Continue reading “UPDATE: Arkansas Supreme Court Clarifies Original and Appellate Jurisdiction for Constitutional Amendments: Forrester v. Daniels.”