Hallelujah! (In other words, the Arkansas Supreme Court is abolishing the abstract and addendum requirement.)

Arkansas Justice Building--Home of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Arkansas Court of Appeals

As we noted in our original post (below), the Arkansas Supreme Court has proposed a set of rule changes that abolish the abstracting and addendum requirement.  In the original post, we promised to provide updates and more details, so we’re doing that now. Before delving into those details, please note that these are proposed revisions, so they are subject to change.  However, if you can get your record in electronic format, you may participate in a pilot project using these rules.  So, with that said, here are the major changes (and, of course, review the per curiam before filing your brief; this is just a general overview):

The Biggest Change: Abolition of the Abstracting and Addendum Requirement

This, of course, is the biggest change.  Attorneys are no longer required to prepare an abstract or an addendum.  Rather, attorneys will refer to the relevant page number in the record.  As mentioned below, the record will now be comprised of two separate portions: a pleading portion and a transcript portion.  If you cite to the pleading portion of the record, use the format (RP 10), and if you cite to the transcript portion, use the format (RT 10).  The court has a computer program that converts those citations to links to the relevant portion of the record.

Preparation and Filing of the Record

As mentioned above, there will now be two portions of the record: pleadings and transcripts.  The record must be in electronic format (PDF), and each portion of the record must be sequentially numbered such that the first page of the PDF is the first page of the record.  This means that whatever the first page of the PDF is (cover page, table of contents, etc.), it must be page 1.Under the proposed rule, attorneys are still responsible for filing the record, but unlike in the past, the record can now be filed electronically.  

Brief Components

In addition to the elimination of the abstract and addendum, the informational statement (the form that included questions about the appeal and the brief) has been eliminated.  The jurisdictional statement has more specific requirements under the proposed rule than under the current rule.  There are also a couple of new sections: a request for relief and a certificate of compliance with Administrative Order No. 19 (relating to confidential information) and with the word-count limitations (discussed in more detail below).  Finally, the “statement of the case” has been replaced with the “statement of the case and facts.”  

Length Limitations

There are two significant changes to the length of the brief.  First, rather than limiting the statement of the case to a certain number of pages and the argument to a certain number of pages, the limitation is a global limitation that can be allocated in whatever way makes the most sense.  Second, the limitation is converted to a word limit, rather than a page limit. The word count includes the jurisdictional statement, the statement of the case and the facts, the argument, and the request for relief. All other portions of the brief are disregarded for purposes of the word count. Here are the limits:

Brief TypeWord Count Limit
Appellant’s Brief8,600
Appellee’s Brief8,600
Reply Brief2,875
Appellee’s/Cross-Appellant’s Brief14,325
Reply/Cross-Appellee’s Brief11,475

 

ORIGINAL POST

As Justice Rhonda Wood described it on Twitter, there was some “HUGE” news from the Arkansas Supreme Court this morning:

Arkansas Supreme Court

We’re still reading the per curiam, and it’s full of changes, 

but here’s a brief synopsis (you can expect a more detailed examination later).

 

First, effective immediately, attorneys may begin requesting electronic records from the circuit clerk, and the circuit clerk is required to provide the record in electronic format.

Second, the Arkansas Supreme Court published for comment revisions to the rules that accommodate these electronic records.  Those rules abolish the requirements of an abstract and addendum.  

Third—and here’s the best part—even though those rules are currently only published for comment (meaning they are not in effect yet), attorneys who choose to file their records electronically are permitted to file under the new rules as part of a pilot project.

As the Supreme Court noted in its per curiam, the abstracting requirement (and, to a lesser extent, the addendum requirement) had outlived their usefulness.  In our opinion, the abstract adds needless time and expense (both in attorney’s fees and printing costs) to the appellate process, it is confusing, and even a well-done abstract can’t effectively capture what occurred at trial.  This is a good move, and we look forward to seeing it fully implemented.  And you can rest assured that we will never order another paper record again!

Electronic Filing of Appellate Briefs is now Mandatory in Arkansas Appellate Courts

The Arkansas Supreme Court has recently issued a per curiam opinion making electronic filing of appellate briefs mandatory as of January 1, 2018.  In its per curiam, the Court made a few changes and clarifications to the pilot project (which had been in place since September 15, 2016).  The Court also slightly modified the method for requesting clerk’s extensions.  We’ve posted the details of these changes (along with a couple of forms) below.  As always, this is just a summary, so please refer to the text of the rules themselves when filing a brief.

Overview of Electronic Filing of Briefs

Here are the key points you need to know if you are filing a brief electronically:

  • Briefs are filed through the eFlex system.
  • The brief must be electronically filed prior to midnight on the due date.
  • The table of contents must contain hyperlinks to the beginning of each major section of the brief.  The “major sections” are:
    • Informational statement and jurisdictional statement;
    • Points on appeal;
    • Table of authorities;
    • Abstract;
    • Statement of the Case;
    • Argument; and
    • Addendum.
  • After the brief is accepted by the court, you must file six paper copies of the brief with the clerk’s office.  In our discussions with the clerk’s office, they have indicated that they prefer that attorneys simply print the file-marked copies (rather than printing clean copies and having the clerk’s office file-mark them).
  • The paper copies are due five calendar days after the brief is filed.  Note that this time period begins with the brief is filed, and not when the brief is accepted by the clerk’s office.
  • We are still serving paper copies of the brief on opposing counsel.  We believe that there is some ambiguity about this in the rules.  Rules 4-4(b)-(e) discuss “service upon opposing counsel,” and seem to imply that the service will be in paper format.  Administrative Order 21, on the other hand, states that “[r]egistered users of the electronic filing system consent to electronic service of electronic documents as the only means deemed to constitute service and such notice of filing is valid and effective service of the document on the registered users and shall have the same legal effect as service by conventional means.”  Until there is some clarity on this, we are continuing to serve opposing counsel in paper format.  We have included a sample of our certificate of service below.

Continue reading “Electronic Filing of Appellate Briefs is now Mandatory in Arkansas Appellate Courts”

2016 Judicial Election Results for Arkansas Supreme Court and Arkansas Court of Appeals

The 2016 nonpartisan judicial elections held in Arkansas on March 1st have resulted in two new Arkansas Supreme Court Justices, one new Judge on the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and one runoff election for a seat on the Arkansas Court of Appeals.  The following are results with nearly all precincts reporting:

Arkansas Supreme Court

Chief Justice Position 1

Association Justice Position 5

Arkansas Court of Appeals

Associate Judge District 2, Position 2

Associate Judge District 5

The runoff election between James McMenis and Mark Klappenbach for the Associate Judge District 5 position on the Arkansas Court of Appeals will take place during the general election on November 8, 2016.

There were also two uncontested races in the Arkansas Court of Appeals: Judge Rita W. Gruber will remain the Associate Justice for District 6, Position 1; and Judge Waymond Brown will keep his seat as District 7 Associate Judge.

Related Post: 2016 Arkansas Supreme Court & Arkansas Court of Appeals Election Roundup

Arkansas Supreme Court’s Procedural Ruling Has Practical Effect of Temporarily Stopping Same-Sex Marriages in Arkansas

Arkansas Supreme CourtLack of Final Order Prevents Arkansas Supreme Court from Issuing a Stay of Pulaski County Circuit Court’s Ruling in Same-Sex Marriage Case

The Arkansas Supreme Court handed down a decision late this afternoon dismissing without prejudice the appeal taken by the State from the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s recent decision declaring Arkansas’s ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional.

According to the per curiam decision, the circuit court’s order was not final because it failed to adjudicate all the claims or to otherwise include a Rule 54(b) certificate, which would allow an interlocutory appeal from an otherwise non-final order.

Arkansas Supreme Court Essentially Holds That a Stay is Unnecessary Because There is No Order Striking Down Licensing Statute

The Arkansas Supreme Court also denied the State’s plea for the Court to help alleviate confusion among circuit clerks by granting a stay pursuant to the Supreme Court’s superintending authority.  The Court noted that because the circuit court had not issued a ruling with respect to Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-11-208(b) (Repl. 2009), “License not issued to persons of the same sex,” the circuit court’s order had no effect on that statute and its prohibition against circuit and county clerks issuing same-sex marriage licenses.

Although the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s decision struck down as unconstitutional two state statutes that ban marriages by people of the same sex (Arkansas Code Annotated Sections 9-11-107, “Validity of foreign marriages” and 9-11-109, “Same sex marriage void”), it failed to rule on Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-11-208(a)(1)(B), which provides, “A license shall not be issued to a person to marry another person of the same sex, and no same-sex marriage shall be recognized as entitled to the benefits of marriage.”  It appears that this means that that statute is still in effect, so the practical effect of this ruling appears to be that circuit clerks are prohibited from issuing licenses to same-sex couples until the circuit court clarifies its ruling.

The Court’s full decision is available here: Arkansas Supreme Court Same-Sex Marriage Decision.

Toward a More Practical Approach to Preservation: Hardin v. Bishop

In a December 2012 blog post, we questioned whether Bayer Cropscience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, represented a “possible departure from Arkansas’s strict preservation rules.” See Procedural Lessons from a $48 Million Dollar Appeal.  As readers of this blog will likely recall, the Arkansas Supreme Court in Schafer addressed whether the punitive damages cap, enacted by the legislature as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, was constitutional.  The trial court had ruled from the bench that the cap was unconstitutional, and in its written order had implicitly held that the cap was unconstitutional (by upholding a jury verdict in excess of the cap).  However, the trial court had not addressed the constitutional argument in its written ruling, and in its ruling from the bench, the trial court had not stated which of two arguments it accepted in holding that the cap was unconstitutional.

In Schafer, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the oral ruling from the bench was adequate.  The Court also held that the lack of an explanation for the trial court’s decision in its written opinion did not prevent the Arkansas Supreme Court from addressing the merits of the constitutional argument.  In our blog post from 2012, we noted that “[i]t will be interesting to see whether the Schafer preservation rule is followed by the Court in decisions to come.”  Last week, in Hardin v. Bishop, 2013 Ark. 395, the Arkansas Supreme Court fully embraced the ruling in Schafer, and overruled a handful of cases in the process.

The Facts

Although the more interesting part of the Hardin opinion (at least for appellate attorneys) is procedural in nature, a simplified summary of the facts is provided for context.  Hardin involved a brush fire that got out of control, damaging a tire shop and some electrical equipment owned by Entergy.  The fire had been started by Mr. Randy Wardlaw, who was burning brush on property that belonged to Ms. India Bishop.  The owner of the tire shop, along with Entergy, sued Mr. Wardlaw and Ms. Bishop (on the theory that Mr. Wardlaw was acting as Ms. Bishop’s agent).  In addition to compensatory damages, the plaintiffs sought to recover double damages under a fire prevention statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 20-22-304.

Ms. Bishop filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no question of material fact that Mr. Wardlaw had caused the damage, and further arguing that Mr. Wardlaw was not acting as her agent when he started the fire.  She also argued, in the alternative, that the fire prevention statute (which allowed the recovery of double damages) did not apply to her.  After a hearing, the trial court granted Ms. Bishop’s motion for summary judgment, but did not state a specific basis for the ruling.  The plaintiffs appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and the Arkansas Supreme Court accepted certification of the case to address the question of whether the plaintiffs’ arguments had been preserved for appeal, given that the trial court had not offered a specific basis for its ruling.

The Opinion: Hardin v. Bishop

In its opinion (written by Justice Courtney Hudson Goodson, who also wrote the majority opinion in Schafer), the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged that “the circuit court generally granted Bishop’s motion for summary judgment without ruling specifically on the arguments presented in the parties’ motions, briefs, and oral arguments.”  The Supreme Court pointed out, however, that the “primary argument” made by Ms. Bishop in her motion for summary judgment was that Mr. Wardlaw was not acting as her agent, and the plaintiffs’ primary argument was that there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether he was acting as her agent.

The Arkansas Supreme Court next looked at the text of two rules.  First, the Court examined Rule 56(c)(2) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues specifically set forth in the motion.”  Second, the Court examined Rule 52(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under these rules.”  (The Court also relied on this rule in reaching the merits of the case in Schafer.)  The Supreme Court appears to have drawn a distinction here between preservation when motions are involved and preservation in other types of cases, holding that “when a case does not involve a motion, we typically adhere to our well-established principle that the failure to obtain a ruling on an issue at the trial court level precludes a review of the issue on appeal.”

Based on these rules, the Supreme Court held that the agency issue was adequately preserved for appeal.  The agency issue had been raised by the parties in their motions and in their oral arguments before the trial court.  The trial court’s order stated that it was “[b]ased upon the adopted pleadings and argument of counsel,” and so the trial court’s order “encompassed the sole issue of agency presented to it . . . .”  Therefore, the agency issue was preserved.

Before moving to the merits of the plaintiffs’ argument regarding agency, the Arkansas Supreme Court acknowledged a line of cases in which the trial court had granted a motion for summary judgment and the Supreme Court had held that, in the absence of specific rulings on numerous claims, that the issue was not preserved for appeal.  In Hardin, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that “[t]o the extent that those cases and their progeny are inconsistent with the holding in the present case, we overrule them.”

The Takeaway: Appellate Practice Tips

This decision definitely relaxes the court’s prior strict preservation rules, and seems to adopt a more common-sense approach to preservation than perhaps has been used in the past.  In Hardin, the trial court had clearly based its decision on the agency issue.  In fact, the agency issue was the only issue raised in the briefs, other than Ms. Bishop’s argument that the statute allowing for double damages did not apply to her.  Because the trial court completely dismissed Ms. Bishop from the case (rather than simply limiting the amount of damages that could be awarded against her), it was clear that the trial court based its decision on Ms. Bishop’s agency argument.

This practical approach to preservation is certain to be welcomed by both trial counsel and appellate counsel.  Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order.  The Court in Hardin was examining a motion for summary judgment that examined only one issue.  In fact, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted two different times that the issue of agency was the “sole” issue raised in the motion for summary judgment, while noting that in the previous decisions that were inconsistent with Hardin, the motions involved “numerous claims.”  In addition, the Supreme Court noted that Hardin involved a motion, and seemed to draw a distinction with cases that do not involve a motion.  Therefore, the safest route still is to obtain a written ruling (along with a basis for the ruling, when the trial court will accommodate such a request) on any important argument that needs to be preserved for appellate review.

Related Posts:

New Arkansas Appellate Court Rules Effective August 1, 2013

Arkansas attorneys filing briefs and motions in the Arkansas Supreme Court or Arkansas Court of Appeals should be aware that two new rules go into effect beginning today (August 1, 2013) that change the procedure for filing briefs and pleadings in Arkansas’s appellate courts.  Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 3-7 requires that a cover sheet now be included with case initiating documents (the initial record or pleading) and Rule 1-8 requires that briefs and pleadings now be submitted electronically in addition to the paper copies also required by the Court’s rules.  The following is a summary of the two new rules.  Of course, we advise that you review these rules in full prior to filing anything in Arkansas’s appellate courts.

Rule 3-7. Cover Sheet

Rule 3-7 of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals requires that a case initiating cover sheet be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals whenever an initial record or pleading is filed in one of Arkansas’s appellate courts. See In Re Adoption of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 3-7. Cover Sheet, 2013 Ark. 277.

The following is an image of the new appellate court cover sheet—a link to the cover sheet form on the Supreme Court’s website (as well as instructions for completing the form) can be found here.

Appellate Court Cover Sheet

Rule 1-8. Courtesy Electronic Copies

In an effort to move toward electronic filing in Arkansas’s appellate courts, the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals are now requiring appellate attorneys to provide a courtesy electronic copy in PDF format of essentially all pleadings and briefs filed in those Courts. See In Re Adoption of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Rule 1-8. Courtesy Electronic Copies, 2013 Ark. 256.  Note that this is in addition to the paper copies that are required by the Courts’ rules.  This new rule will apply to all motions, petitions, writs, briefs, responses, and replies. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-8(a).

Filing of the PDF document by email is not permitted under Rule 1-8.  Rather, appellate attorneys will be required to submit the PDF documents on external media (CD, flash drive, etc.) and will also be required to serve a copy on the other party.

It is important to note that compliance with Administrative Order 19 is still required with the PDF versions of documents that will be filed.  Furthermore, a very specific file naming convention is mandated by the rule.

Rule 1-8 also requires that appellate attorneys include in the paper version of the documents filed a Certificate of Compliance and Identification of Paper Documents not in PDF Format.

Anyone filing documents in the Arkansas Supreme Court or Arkansas Court of Appeals beginning today will need to carefully review this new rules before doing so.

PRACTICAL TIP: If you do not already have software installed on your computer that will allow you to easily convert Word documents to PDF format, there is free software available for download at the following two sites (our firm currently uses the Cute PDF software, which works great):

Procedural Lessons from a $48 Million Dollar Appeal

On December 8, 2011, the Arkansas Supreme Court handed down its decision in Bayer Cropscience LP v. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518.  The Court’s decision is significant for a number of reasons, not the least of which are a couple of procedural issues that might be easily overlooked upon first glance in light of the Court’s holding overruling Arkansas’s punitive damages caps.

Punitive Damages Cap Declared Unconstitutional

“We hold that section 16-55-208 is unconstitutional under article 5, section 32 as it limits the amount of recovery outside the employment relationship.”

In a decision that affirmed a $48 million dollar judgment in favor of Arkansas rice farmers, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that the punitive damage limitations contained in Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-208 are unconstitutional. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 12.

That statute, passed by the Arkansas General Assembly as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, provided for each plaintiff a cap on punitive damages in the amount of $250,000 or three times the amount of compensatory damages (not to exceed $1,000,000). See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-208.

In its opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court observed that the Arkansas Constitution gives the Arkansas General Assembly the power to limit the amount of recovery “only in matters arising between employer and employee.” Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 12.  Article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution, as amended by amended 26, provides the following:

The General Assembly shall have the power to enact laws prescribing the amount of compensation to be paid by employers for injuries to or death of employees, and to whom said payment shall be made.  It shall have power to provide the means, methods, and forum for adjudicating claims arising under said laws, and for securing payment of the same. Provided that otherwise no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property; and in case of death from such injuries the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such action shall be prosecuted.

Ark. Const art. 5, § 32.

On appeal, Bayer argued that article 5, section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution referred only to compensatory damages and not to punitive damages.  The Arkansas Supreme Court, however, disagreed: “Although compensatory and punitive damages serve differing purposes, an award of punitive damages is nonetheless an integrant part of ‘the amount recovered for injuries resulting in death or for injuries to persons or property.’” Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 12 (quoting Ark. Const art. 5, § 32).  Accordingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that section 16-55-208 is unconstitutional under the Arkansas Constitution because it limits the amount of recover outside the employment relationship, which is expressly prohibited by article 5, section 32.

Possible Departure from Arkansas’s Strict Preservation Rules?

The ruling on the punitive damages caps is monumental in and of itself, but what makes it even more interesting is the Court’s analysis of how it was able to reach the merits of that decision, which was an issue that split the Court 6-1.

In her concurring opinion, Justice Karen Baker explained that while she agrees with the outcome reached by the majority, she would not have reached the merits of the constitutionality of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-55-208 because she did not believe that issue was preserved for appellate review. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 24–25 (Baker, J., Concurring).  Justice Baker argued that because the circuit court ruled on the constitutionality of that statute from the bench and entered no written opinion concerning that issue, it was not preserved for appellate review. Id.  In support of her opinion, Justice Baker cited to a number of cases in which the Arkansas Supreme Court has previously declined to rule on constitutional issues that had been ruled on from the bench only and that had not been included in the written orders. See, e.g., Boellner v. Clinical Study Ctrs., LLP, 2011 Ark. 83, at 23, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (holding that the constitutional issue presented in that case was not preserved for appellate review because “[a]lthough the circuit court ruled on this issue from the bench, the final, written order did not address this issue.”).

In footnote 5, Justice Courtney Hudson Goodson, writing for the majority, responded to Justice Baker’s concurring opinion concerning the issue of the constitutionality of the punitive damages cap: “Despite the concurring justice’s protestations to the contrary, it is without question that the issue concerning the constitutionality of the statutory cap on punitive damages is preserved for appeal.”  Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 14 n.5.  In this case, the constitutional issue was raised in a pretrial motion and discussed in a hearing, at which time the circuit court orally declared from the bench that the statute in question was unconstitutional.  According to the Arkansas Supreme Court, its preservation rules “require nothing more.”  Id.

The majority went on to explain that “[a]lthough considered the better practice for a circuit court to explain its decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law are not necessary with regard to decisions on motions.” (emphasis added). Id.  In footnote 5, the majority further explained that if the concurrence was correct in its view, then the Court would also have been precluded from reaching the merits of the circuit court’s decisions in a couple of other issues regarding motions in this appeal, as the circuit court also disposed of those other motions by ruling from the bench. Id.  The Court’s conclusion is that “the circuit court’s failure to specify the ground upon which it found the statute unconstitutional does not deter us from performing our duty to review the circuit court’s decision.” Id.

Although couched as a decision rooted in precedent, Justice Baker seemed to view the Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision to reach the merits of the constitutional issue in this case as a departure from the Court’s strict preservation rules.  It will be interesting to see whether the Schafer preservation rule is followed by the Court in decisions to come.  Regardless of whether it is cited in future decisions, there can be no doubt that it will be cited in numerous appellant’s briefs in the months and years to come.

Perfecting the Notice of Appeal in Light of Posttrial Motions

“A notice of appeal must be judged by what it recites and not what it was intended to recite.” 

Among other arguments on appeal, Bayer also challenged the $42,000,000 punitive damages award as excessive under the U.S. Constitution.  The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to reach this issue because it held that it was not preserved for appellate review. Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 23.

Bayer made its arguments to the circuit court concerning the excessiveness of the damages award in its posttrial motion for new trial and remittitur. Id.  Because the circuit court did not take action on the posttrial motion within the 30-day window allowed pursuant to Rule 4(b)(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure—Civil, that motion was deemed denied at the expiration of the 30-day period. Id. at 23–24.  When the Bayer defendants filed their notices of appeal (all of which were identical), they failed to state in the notices of appeal that the appeal was being sought from both the judgment that was entered as well as the denial of the motion for new trial and remittitur. Id.  The Arkansas Supreme Court held that it is necessary to file a notice of appeal from the denial of the posttrial motion in order to appeal from the issues raised therein. Id. at 24.  According to the Court, unless the notice of appeal references both the final judgment and the deemed-denied ruling, the only appealable matter will be the original order. Id.

The following is a timeline of the post-trial procedural events that occurred in this case:

  • May 5—Judgment Entered
  • May 19—Bayer timely filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new trial, and remittitur.
  • June 18—Motions deemed denied.
  • July 19—Each Bayer defendant filed separate and timely notices of appeal from the judgment entered on May 5, 2010.

See Schafer, 2011 Ark. 518, at 8.

To have preserved this issue for appeal, each of the Bayer defendants could have explained in their notices of appeal that they were appealing from both the May 5th judgment and the lower court’s denial of its motion for new trial and remittitur in the notice of appeal it filed on July 19th.  Another option would have been to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the date the judgment was entered in this matter.  Then, following the deemed-denied date of June 18th, Bayer could have filed an amended notice of appeal within 30 days of June 18th that indicated that it was appealing from both the May 5th judgment and the denial of its motion for new trial and remittitur.

Related Posts:

Court of Appeals Judge Abramson Announces Candidacy for Arkansas Supreme Court Position

Court of Appeals Judge Raymond Abramson announced his candidacy on Monday for the Arkansas Supreme Court position that is currently held by Associate Justice Jim Gunter.  Justice Gunter announced last week that he plans to retire at the end of his term next year.

Judge Abramson, who practiced law for 34 years in Monroe County, was appointed by Governor Beebe to the Court of Appeals last year following Judge Price Marshall’s confirmation as a federal district court judge.  Abramson is not eligible to run for that position to which he was appointed last year.

Currently, Judge Abramson is the only candidate who has announced his or her intent to run for the position currently held by Justice Gunter.

Arkansas Supreme Court Rules Act 1 Unconstitutional

The Arkansas Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision handed down this morning, affirmed the Pulaski County Circuit Court’s decision ruling that Act 1 is unconstitutional as a violation of fundamental privacy rights under the Arkansas Constitution.

The following is a link to the Court’s Decision: DHS v Cole Opinion

Act 1–also known as the Arkansas Adoption and Foster Care Act of 2008–was approved by Arkansas voters by a vote of 57% on November 4, 2008.  Act 1, which went into effect on January 1, 2009, prohibits an individual from adopting or serving as a foster parent if that individual is “cohabiting with a sexual partner outside of a marriage that is valid under the Arkansas Constitution and the laws of this state.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 9-8-304(b).  The prohibition on adoption and foster parenting “applies equally to cohabiting opposite-sex and same-sex individuals.” Ark. Code Ann. Section 9-8-304(b).

In today’s opinion, the Arkansas Supreme Court announced its holding concerning the constitutionality of Act 1 as follows:

We hold that a fundamental right to privacy is at issue in this case and that, under the Arkansas Consitution, sexual cohabitors have the right to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial intimacy in the privacy of their homes.  We further hold that this right is jeopardized by Act 1 which precludes all sexual cohabitors, without exception, from eligibility for parenthood, whether by means of adoption or foster care. 

Proposed Changes to Arkansas Appellate Court Rules Affecting Civil Practice

The Arkansas Supreme Court delivered a per curiam opinion on March 3, 2011, in which the Court announced proposed changes to rules of procedure affecting civil practice.  See In Re Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, 2011 Ark. 99.

The following rule changes to the Arkansas Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were proposed by the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice and are being suggested by the Arkansas Supreme Court: 

  • Rule 2-1. Motions, general rulesThe change would require that motions filed in the appellate courts comply with the style of appellate court briefs.  Currently the rules governing the style of briefs are more specific than the rules governing the styles of motions.  Based on this rule change, motions would be required to be in 14-point font, among other things.
  • Rule 4-1. Style of briefsThis change would increase the page numbers in the Appellant’s reply brief from 15 to 20 pages.  When the Court previously changed Rule 4-1 to require 14-point font to be used in briefs filed in appellate courts, the number of pages for the appellant’s brief and the appellee’s brief was increased by 5 pages.  This rule change would also add an additional 5 pages to the reply brief.  
  • Rule 4-2. Contents of briefsThe statement of the case would increase from a maximum of 5 to a maximum of 6 pages.  This change is also in response to the previous increase in the font size of appellate court briefs from 12 to 14 point font.
  • Rule 6-7. Taxation of costsThis change would increase the total costs for the filing fee that is recoverable by the prevailing party to $165.  This change would reflect the actual cost of filing an appeal in the appellate courts (to include the addition of the $15 technology fee that was previously added to each filing fee).
  • Rule 6-9. Rules for appeals in dependency-neglect casesThis amendment would add a motion to intervene in dependency-neglect proceedings to the list of appealable orders under the expedited appeal procedure of Rule 6-9.

If you wish to comment on these proposed rule changes, make your comments in writing before May 1, 2011, to: Leslie W. Steen, Clerk, Supreme Court of Arkansas, Attn.: Civil Procedure Rules, Justice Building, 625 Marshall Street, Little Rock, Arkansas 72201.